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To better understand not only the minds, but also the hearts of key publics, we have developed a
more systemic approach to understand the responses of audiences in crisis situations. The Integrated
Crisis Mapping (ICM) model is based on a publics-based, emotion-driven perspective where the
publics’ responses to different crises are mapped on 2 continua, the organization’s engagement in
the crisis and primary publics’ coping strategy. This multistage testing found evidence that anxiety
was the default emotion that publics felt in crises. The subsequent emotions felt by the publics varied
in different quadrants involving different crisis types. As far as coping strategies were concerned,
conative coping was more evident than cognitive coping across the 4 quadrants. Evidence also sug-
gested strong merit that conative coping was the external manifestation of the internal cognitive pro-
cessing that had taken place. Cognitive coping was thus the antecedent of conative coping. Although
both the publics and the organizations agreed that the crises were relevant to the organizations’ goals,
they differed on who should assume more responsibility. The findings, although still very much
exploratory, suggest theoretical rigor in the model, with room for further refinements to generate
what Yin (2003) termed ‘‘analytic generalization’’ (p. 33) for the ICM model.
In discussing strategies for effective public relations, Broom (2009) differentiated two types of
strategies, action strategies and communication strategies, to help organizations determine
‘‘what to do’’ and ‘‘what to say’’ (p. 307). Corresponding to Broom’s argument that communi-
cation strategy decision making involves how to propose and implement the content and the
delivery channel of a given message, crisis communication strategies are composed of crisis
response form and crisis response content (Coombs, 2006a). Coombs (2006a) argued that form
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indicates what should be done, and content addresses what is actually said in the messages. The
mainstream of crisis research has focused on crisis response content and how to appropriately
match the crisis communication strategy content with different crisis situations.
Consequently, how to shape the appropriate communication strategies in response to a crisis
is critical for the organization or public relations practitioner. Given that the goals of crisis com-
munication, defined as the ‘‘ongoing dialogue between the organization and its publics’’ prior
to, during, and after the crisis (Fearn-Banks, 2002, p. 2) were to restore organizational normalcy,
influence public perception, and regain and repair image and reputation, strategies used should
be ‘‘designed to minimize damage to the image of the organization’’ (p. 2). Strategies, argued
Massey (2001), were ‘‘message repertoires that are designed to repair the organization’s image
by influencing stakeholder perceptions’’ (p. 155). Ray (1999) argued that strategies establish and
enact ‘‘control (at least in its appearance) in the face of high uncertainty’’ (p. 19). Lukaszweski
(1997) argued that the strategic management of message response in crisis communication is a
‘‘fundamental communication principle’’ (p. 8). Designing sound strategic communication mes-
sages to minimize damage to the image of the organization has been described as ‘‘management
at its zenith’’ (Stocker, 1997, p. 203).
Although most of these strategies should be direct responses to the crisis, Ray (1999) argued
that strategies could either; (a) deny the crisis exists; (b) provide ‘‘partial, inaccurate, or delayed
information’’ (p. 20); or (c) maintain an open communication channels with constituents.
CURRENT SITUATION-BASED CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CRISIS RESPONSE
Arguably, the two dominant theories on crisis strategies, Benoit’s Image Repair theory (Benoit
& Pang, 2008), and Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication theory (Coombs, 2006b, 2007),
are designed to understand what strategies are relevant to use under what circumstances. These
often stem from a situation-based response to crisis. The image repair theory is appropriate to be
used when the situation leads to a loss of face. When face is threatened, face works is used to
repair image, argued Benoit and Pang. This usually occurs when the accused is believed to have
committed an offensive act by its salient audience. Face, image, and reputation are extremely
important because, as a society, Americans pride themselves on and value those who enact
tolerance and sensitivity to the feelings and traditions of others (Benoit, 2004). One facet of
Coombs’ theory is that it is positioned according to the situation based on the organization’s
locus of control. On one hand, when the organization is deemed to have strong personal control
over the crisis, more accommodative strategies like full apology are recommended for use. On
the other hand, when the organization has weak control over the crisis, more defensive strategies
like attack and denial are recommended.
INTEGRATED CRISIS MAPPING MODEL: CONCEPTUALIZING
EMOTIONS IN CRISIS RESPONSES
Although these situation-based crisis responses serve as vital roadmaps to respond to crisis situa-
tions, it is argued that a more systemic approach would be to shape crisis responses from an
emotion-based perspective: to understand what emotional upheavals the publics involved in
the crisis are likely to experience so that strategies can be streamlined to address their specific
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needs. Studies argued that the perception of a crisis, particularly from a given public, is not
strictly a function of an environmental stimulus itself, but involves an interpretation of the stimu-
lus (Carver & Blaney, 1977). Emotion is argued to be a critical stimulus. Lazarus (1991) defined
emotion as ‘‘organized cognitive–motivational–relational configurations whose status changes
with changes in the person–environment relationship as this is perceived and evaluated
(appraisal)’’ (p. 38). In a crisis, emotions are one of the anchors of the publics’ interpretation
of the unfolding and evolving events.
Jin, Pang, and Cameron (2007) have developed a new approach, called the Integrated Crisis
Mapping model (ICM), aimed at understanding the diverse and varied emotions likely to be
experienced by key stakeholders. Dominant emotions in the ICM model, developed from inte-
grating works from psychology and crises literature, are extrapolated on two continua. On the
X-axis is the publics’ coping strategy and on the Y-axis is the level of organizational engage-
ment. Different types of crises, drawn from the crisis literature, are mapped into each of the four
quadrants, with the dominant and secondary emotions posited.
To test the theoretical robustness and ecological validity of the ICM model, this study exam-
ines 14 crises posited in the four quadrants. These cases are studied for their instrumental, rather
than intrinsic, values. In instrumental case studies, Stake (1998) argued that the cases are exam-
ined to provide ‘‘insight into an issue or refinement of theory’’ (p. 88). Data for the 14 crises
came from content analyses of the population of stories published in the five largest circulating
and widely influential national newspapers in the United States. To ensure that media coverage
reflects organizational perspectives, the respective organizations’ Web sites were accessed to
analyze their official announcements through press releases. However, as such information
was not available in all of the cases, we decided to standardize procedures and analyzed only
media coverage for more comparable analyses.
This study is significant on four fronts. First, this represents the authors’ attempt to understand
how an organization and its primary public appraise a crisis; second, how different organizational
engagement levels and public coping strategies can lead to different positioning on the crisis map
driven by the primary emotion felt by the publics. Third, how different crisis mapping can impact
organizational response. Fourth, and more significantly, this represents our program of research in
developing a new theoretical framework founded on a publics-driven, emotion-based conceptua-
lization in crisis communication. We believe that understanding the role of emotions in crisis
should be the next frontier of crisis research (Jin & Pang, 2010). We begin this process by study-
ing real life phenomena. Saunders (2004) argued that applying theory to real life situations is
‘‘useful towards theory building’’ because such situations ‘‘provide observations grounded in
actual organizational efforts aimed at solving actual organizational problems’’ (p. 140). Fourteen
cases were explored in order to construct a more robust study (Yin, 1993).
This article represents the culmination of multistage empirical tests, spread over 4 years, to
test the theoretical and practical rigor of the ICM model. Specifically, it consolidates the results
of the dominant emotions unearthed and coping strategies of the publics. We are excited to
understand how well the hypotheses posited in the model hold up, and what subsequent refine-
ments need to be made to stand the scrutiny of scholarship as well as its relevance to practi-
tioners. Through the building of this model, it is our goal to advance current understanding in
crisis communication and offers practical insights on how one can understand, with greater pre-
ciseness, the emotional upheavals primary publics are likely to experience so that one can shape
the appropriate crisis response to manage the crisis with optimal effectiveness. Managing the
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needs and emotions of the primary publics, or ‘‘victims’’ in Ogrizek and Guillery’s (1999) ter-
minology, has become the ‘‘central challenge’’ in crisis communication (Filizzola & Lopez,
1995, cited in Ogrizek and Guillery, 1999, p. 60; Coombs, 2006b). If emotions do, indeed, affect
attitude and behavior (Turner, 2007), then understanding emotions would give practitioners a
preview of the likely behavior publics may exhibit so that strategies can be shaped to meet such
reactions.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Thus, Jin, Pang, and Cameron’s (2007) ICM model (see Figure 1) is aimed at unearthing the
diverse and varied emotions likely to be experienced by key stakeholders.
Identifying Primary Publics in Crises
Publics are a ‘‘group of people who face a common issue’’ (Gonzelez-Herrero & Pratt, 1996,
p. 84). Different scholars have different terms for it. Ulmer, Sellnow and Seeger (2007) referred
to them as stakeholders. Benoit and Pang (2008) referred to them as audiences, and Fearn-Banks
(2001) used the publics and stakeholders interchangeably. This interchangeable definition
(Rawlins, 2006) is the approach we adopt here. Benoit and Pang (2008) argued that identifi-
cation of key publics is important because different audiences have ‘‘diverse interests, concerns,
and goals’’ (p. 247). Rawlins (2006) argued that there are several ways to prioritize publics. He
suggested four: (a) identifying them according to their relationship to the organization; (b)
FIGURE 1 Integrated Crisis Mapping (ICM) model (Jin, Pang, & Cameron, 2007). (Figure available in color online.)
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prioritizing them according to their attributes; (c) prioritizing them according to their relationship
to the crisis situation; and (d) prioritizing them according to the communication strategy. Ulmer,
Sellnow and Seeger (2007) offered a subtly different perspective. They argued that primary pub-
lics are groups of people identified by organizations as ‘‘most important to their success’’ (p. 37)
and secondary stakeholders ‘‘do not play an active role in the day-to-day activities’’ (p. 37) of
the organization. The authors argued that in determining who their primary publics are, organiza-
tions should delineate which of their multiple audiences they hold regular communications with,
and who do they deem critical in the organizations’ strategic missions. Ulmer (2001) categorized
publics in terms of their long-term influences. He regarded the primary public as the community
where the organization is based, and the organization’s employees. The customer and the media
would be classified as secondary publics.
For our conceptualization, we propose that the primary publics comprise the following char-
acteristics: (a) They are most affected by the crisis; (b) they have shared common interests; and
(c) they have long-term interests and influences on the organization’s reputation and operation.
Understanding Publics’ Emotions
In seeking to understand publics’ responses in crises, we draw insights from Lazarus’ (1991)
work. Lazarus proposed that there are two types of appraisals: primary vs. secondary. Primary
appraisal addresses whether, and how, an encounter or situation is relevant to one’s own
well-being. Its components include goal relevance,1 goal congruence or incongruence,2 and
the engagement of the party.3 In the processing of emotion from a public’s point of view, the
central issue of the crisis is always goal relevance. Conceivably, the goal relevance from the per-
spectives of both the publics and the organization involved in the same crisis are likely to differ.
Lazarus (1991) argued that secondary appraisal refers to an evaluation of one’s options and
resources for coping with the situation and future prospects. This means that during crisis, the
public has to explore whether action is required to manage it, and if so, what kind of action ought
to be taken. The public can assume any of these three components proposed: (1) blame or
credit;4 (2) coping potential;5 or (3) future expectancy.6 In a crisis, blaming takes precedence
over credits. The coping potential and future expectancy specify any given action the public
or organization may assume to prevent harm and to help one manage the demands of the crisis,
as well as to evaluate whether the strategy adopted is feasible and what possible outcomes can be
expected.
1If an event is relevant to an individual’s personal goals, an emotion is generated; if not, an emotion will not be gen-
erated (Lazarus, 1991).
2If the goal is congruent, the consequent event will be evaluated as positive. If the goal is incongruent, then negative
emotions will be elicited (Lazarus, 1991).
3How much the other party (other individuals or agents) is contributing, responsible, and involved in the event
(Lazarus, 1991).
4Accountability of what happened (Lazarus, 1991).
5Whether an individual chooses to be problem-focused or emotion-focused when it comes to how he or she copes
with or adapt to the situation (Lazarus, 1991).
6Whether and how an individual expects himself or herself to respond to the situation (Lazarus, 1991).
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In a crisis, Lazarus (1991) argued that there are predominantly six negative emotions (anger,
fright, anxiety, guilt, shame, and sadness) based upon how the crisis is appraised by the public,
driven by different core relational themes. As the crises examined here are those thrust on the
publics (i.e., crises not caused by the publics), we argue that four of the six (anger, fright, anxi-
ety, and sadness) would be dominant emotions experienced by the publics, with guilt and shame
secondary or subsumed emotions.
Anger. The core relational theme underlying anger is a demanding offense against ‘‘me’’
and ‘‘mine’’ (Lazarus, 1991, p. 222). In a crisis, the primary publics tend to experience anger
when faced with a demanding offense from the organization. The primary publics would engage
in the following rationalization process First, the ego-involvements (such as esteem, moral
values, and sense of well-being) of the publics are engaged to preserve or enhance their identities
in the situation. Second, there is usually an issue of blaming. Specifically, the organization is
invariably the object of blame for not controlling the crisis or preventing it from happening.
As far as coping strategy development and action tendency assessment are concerned, the pri-
mary public might potentially attack the organization. However, anger can disappear when the
defense against the organization is successful. It will continue to fester when the primary pub-
lics’ initial self-defense fails. Anger can be expressed indirectly in passively aggressive tactics
that the organization would well seek to detect if it wants to identify the appropriate strategies
to deal with such emotional outrage.
Fright. The core relational theme is facing uncertain and existential threat (Lazarus, 1991).
In terms of the publics’ appraisal process, they find the situation of dealing with the organization
as relevant to their goals, yet incongruent. Organization-based identity issue or ego-involvement
issue may or may not be relevant. Depending on the nature of the crisis, the publics may blame
the organization for how they feel.
As far as coping strategy is concerned, the publics may not be certain about how to cope with
the loss, as well as how the organization may manage the situation. Depending on their abilities
based on resource and power, less influential publics may choose avoidance or escape from the
crisis as a possible recourse (action tendency).
Anxiety. This stems from the core relational theme of facing an immediate, concrete, and
overwhelming danger (Lazarus, 1991). The publics may feel overwhelmed by the crisis and look
for immediate solutions. Accordingly, the publics may go through the following appraisal pro-
cess: They may assess the situation as relevant but not congruent with their survival goals. Their
ego-involvements are evidenced in their efforts to protect their own ego-identities against the
organization that they perceive to be the direct source of existential threat. Additionally, they
may blame the organization for how they feel. Given the uncertainty of how to cope with the
situation and how the organization may react, the publics may attempt to avoid and escape from
the situation. Noticeably, the action tendencies of publics under fright and anxiety may overlap.
This may give crisis managers sufficient consolidation of resources to effectively deal with the
publics under these situations.
Sadness. Experiencing irrevocable loss is the core relational theme here (Lazarus, 1991),
where the publics suffer from tangible or intangible loss or both. Their survival goals are threa-
tened and the loss of ego-involvements may lead the publics in desperate need for relief and
comfort. If they perceive that the loss can be restored or compensated for, this sadness may fade
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and be replaced by hope. For successful crisis management, the organization may consider cre-
ating a favorable expectation by associating their efforts with hope while disassociating the situ-
ation with hopelessness and depression. The action tendency of the publics depends on what
measures the organization takes.
Based on these emotions, we posit that the primary publics are likely to experience two levels
of emotions. The primary level emotion is the one the publics experience at the first, or immedi-
ate, instance. The secondary level emotion is the one the publics experience in subsequent
instances and contingent upon the organization’s responses to the crisis. The secondary level
emotion may be transferred from the dominant emotion or coexist with the primary level emotion.
Operationalization of the ICM Model
As Figure 1 illustrates, the ICM model is premised on a crisis matrix based on two axes. On the
X-axis is the publics’ coping strategy. Adapting from Lazarus’ (1991) cognitive appraisal theory
in emotion research, we argue that there are two types of coping: (a) problem-focused coping,
which involves changing the actual relationship between the publics and the organization
through actual measures and steps taken; and (b) cognitive-focused coping, which involves
changing only the way in which the relationship is interpreted by the publics. During the coping
process, the publics can alter or revise their interpretations based on the exigencies of the situ-
ation. For instance, an accident on the organization’s premises necessitates high engagement
from the organization. The publics may engage in cognitive coping and may feel sad on the first
and immediate instance, which we describe as the primary-level dominant emotion. This may
lead to a secondary-level response, which may be fright, when the circumstances leading to
the accident are communicated or satisfactorily explained. On the Y-axis of the ICM model is
the level of organizational engagement by the organization, ranging from high to low. Organi-
zation engagement is operationalized as a combination of the relevance between what had hap-
pened in the crisis and the organizational goal in operational and reputational success, based on
Lazarus’ primary appraisal propositions, as well as the organization’s responsibility of the crisis,
based on Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs, 2007). Jin et al. (2007)
defined high organizational engagement as intense, consolidated, and sustained, with priority
given in allocation of resources to deal with the crisis. On the contrary, low organizational
engagement means the organization devotes comparatively less resources, effort, and energy
to deal with the crisis, either because the organization argues there is little it can do or because
the organization argues it did not cause the crisis and seeks to call on external help, like a regu-
latory agency, to help it resolve the crisis. For instance, an organization whose operations are
affected by tightening of financial policies and credit may argue that there is little it can do,
and thus may be described as lowly engaged as it does not pour in resources to deal with the
problem. Instead, it may call on regulatory authorities to provide more funding and create more
opportunities for industries to cope.
In each quadrant are categorizations of crisis types, conceptualized based on three criteria:
1) Internal-external; 2) Personal-public; and 3) Unnatural-natural. An external-public-natural
crisis, like economic downturn, natural disaster, and accident, would likely necessitate higher
level of engagement from the organization. For instance, the 2005 Tsunami disaster that
swept across most parts of Asia is one no government could plan for. Coombs (1998) categorized
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these events as external locus of control and weak personal responsibility on the organization’s part.
At the same time, some variations of catastrophe, involving internal-public-natural or unnatural, like
labor unrest, and loss of reputation as a result of mismanagement, require high organizational
engagement as well. While serious, some internal-personal-unnatural (i.e., man-made) crisis, like
human resource problem involving employees, or psychopathic acts, necessitate relatively less
intense organizational engagement, particularly when the organization did not cause these problems
to arise.
Emotions and coping strategy. The two axes further form four quadrants in the crisis
matrix. In each of the quadrants is the dominant emotion, based on the confluence and interac-
tions of the publics’ coping strategy as well as organizational engagement.
Quadrant 1: High engagement=Conative coping. Anger may be fueled when the publics
hold the organization responsible. On the secondary level, the publics may feel anxious when
they deem the organization as not doing enough. Conative coping strategy is driven by action
tendency, the feeling that the publics can, and must, do something about the situation.
Quadrant 2: High engagement=Cognitive coping. The primary level emotion is sadness;
and the secondary level emotion is fright. These are crises that give rise to emotions that the
primary publics could only comprehend at the cognitive level. With further comprehension
based on coping strategy, it may lead to suppressed emotions.
Quadrant 3: Low engagement=Cognitive coping. When the primary publics realize that
there is little the organization can do, or the organization is devoting relatively less resources to
the crisis when it should be doing more, the emotion of fright is experienced. Fright may give
way to sadness, a further manifestation of the helplessness of the situation.
Quadrant 4: Low engagement=Conative coping. Anxiety is caused by the perception of
the organization’s low engagement and possible inertia. On the immediate level, the publics may
feel anxious because they feel the organization is not doing enough. This may give rise to anger,
and anger may lead them to take matters in their own hands.
Based on these descriptions, we seek to understand through the 14 cases:
RQ1: What are the primary emotions displayed by the primary publics, as evident in the news coverage?
RQ2: What is the extent of the organizations’ engagements in the crises, as evident in the news
coverage?
According to Lazarus (1991), after the evaluation of one’s options and resources for coping with
the situation, decision on future prospects needs to be made on whether action is required, and if so,
what kind of action ought to be taken. In a crisis situation, a natural reaction would be for the pub-
lics to blame the organization. The coping potential, and future expectancy, specify any given action
the publics may take to manage the demands of the situation. Thus, we seek to examine,
RQ3: What coping strategies are adopted by the primary publics, as evident in the news coverage?
In addition, we are interested in exploring whether there is any gap between the publics and
organizations’ perceptions of organization engagement and the publics’ coping strategy, as
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adjusting crisis response according to publics’ crisis assessment is pivotal for crisis managers in
a crisis. Therefore:
RQ4: What, if any, is the difference in perception of the degree in organization engagement between
the organization and its primary publics?
RQ5: What, if any, is the difference in perception of the degree of the publics’ coping strategy
between the organization and its publics?
METHOD
We attempt to understand the veracity and rigor of the ICM model by studying real-life cases.
Case studies allow the researcher to delve into and explain the uniqueness and complexity of
organizational processes and to capture the essential processes of decision-making, implemen-
tation and change (Gummesson, 2000). The purpose of case studies is to empirically investigate
a ‘‘contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context’’ and address a ‘‘situation in which the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’’ (Yin, 1993, p. 59). In this
study, we adopt a multiple case study design with the primary interest of understanding how the
ICM model works. The cases are thus studied for their instrumental, rather than intrinsic, values
(Stake, 1998). Although the cases are analyzed in detail and contexts explored, these play sup-
porting roles to the researchers’ objectives, which are to facilitate understanding of how the cases
inform the building of the model. Yin (1993) argued that this is an appropriate initial attempt at
theory testing, with the aim of building ‘‘analytic generalizations’’ (Yin, 2003, p. 33).
Sample
Fourteen crises in the United States are content analyzed. These cases were selected based on the
opinions and suggestions of a group of public relations practitioners and educators to represent
the crisis types posited in the four quadrants.7 This method has been found to be a viable way of
identifying the appropriate crises to analyze (see Shin, Cheng, Jin, & Cameron, 2005).
Data for content analyses come from the population of stories published on the cases in the
largest circulating and widely influential national newspapers in the United States, namely USA
Today, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, and Washington Post (Audit
Bureau of Circulations, 2006; Viguerie & Franke, 2004). News stories in the five major news-
papers (N¼ 328) were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the key words of the organiza-
tion and the crisis (see Table 1 and Appendix A for the case details and selection process; see
Appendix B for the primary publics identified in stories by different cases). News stories were
excluded if (a) there was no comment made by a spokesperson from the respective organization
or official from the organization or no mention of any official communication from the organi-
zation or (b) the stories were in the same publication or there was no mention of the crisis.
7A panel of case discussion and brainstorming was constructed, composed of three PR educators, two crisis
managers, and two PR graduate students. The ICM model was introduced and explained. Interactive discussions were
conducted to generate proper case examples for each mapped crisis types, based on the panel members’ professional
experience and intuitive insights based on crisis management daily practice.
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Coders and Training
Four coders, all graduate students and familiar with the content analysis method, conducted the
coding at different stages of the tests. Sets of two coders were responsible for coding specific
quadrants. With the help of a codebook, the coders were given detailed instruction and descrip-
tion of the various categories used. Practice sessions were held using samples of stories to famil-
iarize with the coding instruments. The coders worked independently and were not allowed to
consult with one another during the process. The intercoder reliability achieved an item-average
of .83 using Scott’s Pi.
Coding Instrument
The unit of analysis is defined as a news story. This includes stories by staff and stories adapted
from wire sources. The 328 stories were coded for the following variables.
Publics’ emotion expressed (from a list of sadness, fright, anger and sadness). Prim-
ary emotion and secondary emotion were measured on a 7-point Likert-like scale, where 1 was
not evident (no trace of display of emotion), and 7 was very evident (vivid and graphic descrip-
tion of facial expression of the publics and direct quote on the emotion expressed), scoring the
highest and second highest among other negative emotions, respectively. An other emotion(s)
option (other than the primary four negative emotions) was also included and asked to be
specified by the coders. For instance, in the HP case, when a shareholder commented, ‘‘It’s
an inopportune time for corporate governance issues like this to crop up because it takes away
from the turnaround that’s going on. . . . As a shareholder, I’m not happy about that’’ (‘‘HP
won’t renominate director, citing leaks,’’ 2006), we coded that as anger. Or, when Ford offered
buyouts to factory workers and the union president responded by saying that members were
TABLE 1
Crisis Case and Newspaper Story Summary by Integrated Crisis Mapping Quadrants
Quadrant 1 Quadrant 2
Reputation: Hewlett Packard case (N¼ 82) Economic=hostile takeovers: US Airways’ takeover bid of Delta
Air Lines case (N¼ 20)
Technological breakdown: Dell’s battery recall case
(N¼ 20)
Natural Disasters: Ameren dealing with power outage case
(N¼ 14)
Industrial matters: Sago mine case (N¼ 27) Accidents: BP refinery blast case (N¼ 18)
Labor unrest=protest: Ford job cutback case
(N¼ 69)
Regulation=legislation: CIA Military Commissions
Act case (N¼ 61)
Quadrant 4 Quadrant 3
Security issues: T. J. MAXX case (N¼ 25) Psychopathic acts=terrorism: Virginia Tech shooting case (N¼ 16)
Human resource: Wal-Mart case (N¼ 31) Rumors: Rumors of Gonzales resignation case (N¼ 18)
Transport failure: Amtrak case (N¼ 13) CEO retirement: Merck CEO retirement case (N¼ 10)
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‘‘stepping up to make hard choices under difficult circumstances’’ (O’Dell, 2006), we coded that
as anxiety.
We also coded the scales of the respective emotions according to the intensity evident in the
news coverage. Using the Sago Mining case in quadrant 1 as an example, we offer some sampler
statements on how we code emotions on the Likert scale. When it was reported that the daughter
of one of the miners who died had gone to identify the body, her seemingly sad response after
seeing the note written by the miners before they died appeared to be muted (Barringer &
Goodman, 2006), we coded it as sadness and 1 on the Likert scale, which meant showing no trace
of emotion. When company officials informed family members that only one body was found
while others were not, and ‘‘people wailed in anguish’’ (Dao & Barringer, 2006, p. 1), we coded
it as sadness and 4 on the Likert scale, which meant ‘‘we are affected’’ display of emotion. When
family members questioned the amount of time the company took to send rescue teams into the
mine and they felt there was inertia and the sentiment was that ‘‘everyone was waiting for every-
one else to make a move’’ (Barringer & Goodman, 2006, p. 1), we coded it as anxiety and 3 on the
Likert scale, which meant that the emotion had occurred, with no further description of the emo-
tion. When family members found out that the miners had tried to find their way out of the mines
before they eventually died, one family member showed how exasperated he was when he said,
‘‘’This ain’t hearsay. This came from Hatfield’s[(the CEO of the International Coal Group, the
mine’s owner] mouth’’ (Harris, 2006, p. 18), we coded it as anxiety and 6 on the Likert scale.
Publics’ coping strategy. First, publics’ willingness to change their opinion of the crisis
(cognitive coping) was measured on a 7-point Likert-like scale, where 1 was not evident.
Second, a primary public’s willingness to take actions to address the crisis (conative coping)
was measured on a 7-point Likert-like scale, where 1 was not evident and 7 was very evident.
The same set of coping strategy variables were also measured from the organization’s perspec-
tive as evidence in the news stories. For instance, in the HP case, when a shareholder who owned
200HP shares filed a proposal to separate the roles of chairman and CEO so that only an inde-
pendent director, not a company executive, could be chairman (Granelli, 2006), we coded it as
conative coping because it meant the primary public in the story was actively taking action to
deal with the situation.
Organizational engagement. First, organization’s appraisal of the relevance between
organizational goal and the crisis was measured on a 7-point Likert-like scale, where 1 was very
low (the crisis has nothing to do with the organization’s goals, and is not likely at all to put the
organization operation and reputation in danger) and 7 was very high (the crisis hits the orga-
nization’s goals and creates devastating damage). Second, organization’s appraisal of its
responsibility of the crisis was measured on a 7-point Likert-like scale, where 1 was very
low, and 7 was very high. The same set of engagement variables were also measured from a
primary public’s perspective as evidenced in the news stories. For instance, in the HP case, when
Mark Hurd, the new CEO who took over Patricia Dunn, told employees in an e-mail that ‘‘we
will continue to gather and review all the relevant facts. I can assure you we will get to the bot-
tom of this and take appropriate action’’ (‘‘HP Exec Seeks to Mend Fences,’’ 2006), we coded it
as the organization highly involved, demonstrating the organization’s willingness to pour all its
resources to managing the crisis.
For each of the aforementioned variables, the number 99 was used if that variable or related
issue was not addressed in the story.
276 JIN, PANG, AND CAMERON
RESULTS
Primary Emotions
RQ1 examined the primary emotions displayed by the publics, as is evident in the news cover-
age. For easier reading of the results, please see Table 2 for the summary of key findings by
quadrants and crisis cases and also Figure 2 for the illustration of the revised primary and sec-
ondary emotion combinations in the four quadrants.
Organizational Engagement
RQ2 examined the extent of organizations’ engagement in the crises, as is evident in the news
coverage (see Table 3 for the summary of key findings by quadrants and crisis cases).
Quadrant 1. For the HP case, the organization tended to perceive the crisis as related to the
organization’s goals, but not closely related to the operation and=or reputation of the organiza-
tion (M¼ 3.62, SD¼ .93); in terms of crisis responsibility, evidence showed the organization
veered from assuming traces of responsibility to staying neutral (M¼ 3.75, SD¼ 1.09). For
the Dell case, a similar pattern occurs: The organization tended to perceive that the crisis was
related to the organization’s goals, but not closely related to the operation and=or reputation
of the organization (M¼ 3.80, SD¼ 1.06); in terms of crisis responsibility, it veered from
assuming traces of responsibility to staying neutral (M¼ 4.10, SD¼ 1.83). For the Sago Mining
case, the organization tended to perceive the crisis as somewhat closely related to the organiza-
tion’s goals but not essentially relevant to the operation and=or reputation of the organization
(M¼ 4.47, SD¼ .84); in terms of crisis responsibility, it veered from assuming traces of
responsibility to staying neutral (M¼ 3.64, SD¼ 1.09). For the Ford case, the organization
tended to perceive the crisis as somewhat closely related to the organization’s goals but not
essentially relevant to the operation and=or reputation of the organization (M¼ 5.28,
SD¼ .83); in terms of crisis responsibility, it veered from assuming traces of responsibility to
staying neutral (M¼ 4.30, SD¼ .73). For the immigration case, the organization tended to per-
ceive the crisis as related to the organization’s goals but not closely related to the operation
and=or reputation of the organization (M¼ 4.28, SD¼ .70); in terms of crisis responsibility, it
veered from assuming traces of responsibility to staying neutral (M¼ 3.90, SD¼ .44).
Quadrant 2. For the BP case, the organization tended to perceive the crisis as somewhat
closely related to the organization’s goals, but not essentially related to the operation and repu-
tation of the organization (M¼ 4.61, SD¼ .78); although it admitted responsibility for the crisis
(M¼ 5.11, SD¼ 1.02). For the US Airways’ takeover bid of Delta Air Lines case, the organiza-
tion also tended to perceive the crisis as related to the organization’s goals, but not closely
related to the operation and=or reputation of the organization (M¼ 4.35, SD¼ .59). In terms
of crisis responsibility, it remained neutral (M¼ 4.00, SD¼ .00). For the Ameren’s power outage
case, the organization perceived the crisis as somewhat closely related with the organization’s
goals but not essentially relevant to the operation and=or reputation of the organization
(M¼ 5.09, SD¼ .83); in terms of crisis responsibility, it remained neutral (M¼ 4.00, SD¼ .39).
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TABLE 2
Primary Emotions Displayed by Integrated Crisis Mapping Quadrants
Quadrant 1 Quadrant 2
Reputation: HP case Economic=Hostile takeovers: US Airways’ takeover case
Primary emotion: Primary emotion:
Anger (M¼ 2.09, SD¼ 1.40) Anxiety (M¼ 2.76, SD¼ 1.25)
Secondary emotion: Secondary emotion:
Anxiety (M¼ 2.09, SD¼ 1.30) Anger (M¼ 1.94, SD¼ 1.20)
Other emotions: Other emotions:
Sadness (M¼ 1.10, SD¼ .53) Fright (M¼ 1.35, SD¼ .00)
Fright (M¼ 1.10, SD¼ .45)
Technological breakdown: Dell case Natural disasters: Ameren case
Primary emotion: Primary emotion:
Anger (M¼ 3.17, SD¼ 2.08) Anxiety (M¼ 3.67, SD¼ .82)
Secondary emotion: Secondary emotion:
Anxiety (M¼ 2.50, SD¼ 1.68) Sadness (M¼ 2.33, SD¼ 1.51)
Other emotions: Other emotions:
Sadness (M¼ 1.67, SD¼ 1.23) Anger (M¼ 2.17, SD¼ 1.84)
Fright (M¼ 1.00, SD¼ .00) Fright (M¼ 1.83, SD¼ 1.33)
Industrial matters: Sago mine case Accidents: BP refinery blast case (N¼ 18)
Primary emotion: Primary emotion:
Anxiety (M¼ 4.48, SD¼ 2.06) Anxiety (M¼ 3.00, SD¼ 1.52)
Secondary emotion: Secondary emotion:
Sadness (M¼ 3.20, SD¼ 2.00) Fright (M¼ 2.00, SD¼ 1.57)
Other emotions: Other emotions:
Anger (M¼ 2.96, SD¼ 2.01) Sadness (M¼ 1.43, SD¼ .85)
Fright (M¼ 2.92, SD¼ 1.80) Anger (M¼ 1.36, SD¼ .93)
Labor unrest=Protest: Ford case
Primary emotion:
Anxiety (M¼ 4.17, SD¼ 1.49)
Secondary emotion:
Sadness (M¼ 2.63, SD¼ 1.72)
Other emotions:
Anger (M¼ 1.69, SD¼ 1.08)
Fright (M¼ 2.23, SD¼ 1.59)
Regulation=Legislation: CIA case
Primary emotion:
Anxiety (M¼ 2.38, SD¼ 1.42)
Secondary emotion:
Anger (M¼ 2.02, SD¼ 1.47)
Other emotions:
Sadness (M¼ 1.04, SD¼ .29)
Fright (M¼ 1.04, SD¼ .29)
Quadrant 4 Quadrant 3
Security issues: T. J. MAXX case Psychopathic acts=Terrorism: Virginia Tech shooting case
Primary emotion: Primary emotion:
Anger (M¼ 1.48, SD¼ 1.29) Anxiety (M¼ 3.88, SD¼ 2.17)
(Continued )
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Quadrant 3. For Merck’s CEO retirement case, the organization tended to perceive the
crisis as related to the organization’s goals but not closely related to the operation and=or
reputation of the organization (M¼ 4.00, SD¼ .82); in terms of crisis responsibility, it
remained neutral (M¼ 3.90, SD¼ .99). For the Virginia Tech shooting case, the organization
TABLE 2
Continued
Quadrant 4 Quadrant 3
Secondary emotion: Secondary emotion:
Sadness (M¼ 1.42, SD¼ 1.31) Fright (M¼ 3.75, SD¼ 2.50)
Other emotions: Other emotions:
Anxiety (M¼ 1.39, SD¼ 1.50) Sadness (M¼ 3.38, SD¼ 2.07)
Anger (M¼ 2.75, SD¼ 1.67)
Human resource: Wal-Mart case Rumors: Gonzales resignation case
Primary emotion: Emotions displayed:
Anxiety (M¼ 1.72, SD¼ 1.99) Anxiety (M¼ 1.20, SD¼ .63)
Secondary emotion: Fright (M¼ 1.20, SD¼ .63)
Sadness (M¼ 1.52, SD¼ 1.09) Anger (M¼ 1.20, SD¼ .63)
Other emotions:
Anger (M¼ 1.48, SD¼ 1.66)
Transport failure: Amtrak case CEO retirement: Merck case
Primary emotion: No emotion displayed in the news analyzed
Anxiety (M¼ 2.85, SD¼ 2.88)
Secondary emotion:
Anger (M¼ 2.38, SD¼ 2.63)
Other emotions:
Sadness (M¼ 2.23, SD¼ 1.42)
FIGURE 2 Revised Integrated Crisis Mapping (ICM) model. (Figure available in color online.)
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TABLE 3
Primary Publics’ Coping Strategy and Organizational Issue Engagement Level by
Integrated Crisis Mapping Quadrants
Quadrant 1 Quadrant 2
Reputation: HP case Economic=Hostile takeovers: US Airways’ takeover case
. More conative coping (M¼ 5.14, SD¼ 1.09) than
cognitive coping (M¼ 4.53, SD¼ 1.19)
. More conative coping (M¼ 4.94, SD¼ 1.20) than
cognitive coping (M¼ 3.35, SD¼ 1.37)
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 3.62, SD¼ .93; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 3.75,
SD¼ 1.09)
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 4.35, SD¼ .59; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 4.00,
SD¼ .00)
Technological breakdown: Dell case Natural disasters: Ameren case
. No coping strategy preference . More conative coping (M¼ 5.33, SD¼ 1.03) than
cognitive coping (M¼ 4.33, SD¼ .82)
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 3.80, SD¼ 1.06; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 4.10,
SD¼ 1.83)
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 5.09, SD¼ .83; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 4.00,
SD¼ .39)
Industrial matters: Sago Mine case Accidents: BP case
. More conative coping (M¼ 4.79, SD¼ .78) than
cognitive coping (M¼ 3.96, SD¼ 1.33)
. No coping strategy preference
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 4.47, SD¼ .84; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 3.64,
SD¼ 1.09)
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 4.61, SD¼ .78; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 5.11,
SD¼ 1.02)
Labor unrest=Protest: Ford case
. More conative coping (M¼ 4.64, SD¼ .96) than
cognitive coping (M¼ 4.27, SD¼ 1.21)
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 5.28, SD¼ .83; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 4.30,
SD¼ .73)
Regulation=Legislation: CIA case
. More conative coping (M¼ 5.40, SD¼ .65) than
cognitive coping (M¼ 4.74, SD¼ 1.13)
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 4.28, SD¼ .70; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 3.90,
SD¼ .44)
Quadrant 4 Quadrant 3
Security issues: T. J. MAXX case Psychopathic acts=Terrorism: Virginia Tech shooting case
. More conative coping (M¼ 5.59, SD¼ 2.28) than
cognitive coping (M¼ 3.94, SD¼ 1.18)þ
. No coping strategy preference
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 4.46, SD¼ 1.67; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 1.25,
SD¼ 1.03)
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 4.31, SD¼ .60; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 3.56,
SD¼ .73)
Human resource: Wal-Mart case Rumors: Gonzales resignation case
. No coping strategy preference) . No coping strategy preference
. Organization engaged (Goal relevance: M¼ 5.94,
SD¼ 1.48; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 5.59, SD¼ 1.42
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 2.89, SD¼ .68; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 2.39,
SD¼ .50)
Transport failure: Amtrak case CEO retirement: Merck case
. More cognitive coping (M¼ 3.67, SD¼ 2.60) than
conative coping (M¼ 3.11, SD¼ 2.57)þ
. No coping strategy preference
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tended to perceive the crisis as related to the organization’s goals but not closely related to the
operation and=or reputation of the organization (M¼ 4.31, SD¼ .60); in terms of crisis
responsibility, it veered from assuming traces of responsibility to staying neutral (M¼ 3.56,
SD¼ .73). For the Gonzalez case, the organization tended to perceive the crisis as indirectly
related to the organization’s goals, which harms the organization minimally (M¼ 2.89,
SD¼ .68); in terms of crisis responsibility, it took minimum responsibility for the crisis
(M¼ 2.39, SD¼ .50).
Quadrant 4. For the Amtrak case, the organization tended to perceive the crisis as some-
what closely related to the organization’s goals, but not essentially related to the operation
and reputation of the organization (M¼ 5.33, SD¼ .71); it was reluctant to admit its responsi-
bility for the crisis (M¼ 3.44, SD¼ 2.19). For the T. J. MAXX case, the organization also
tended to perceive the crisis as related to the organization’s goals, but not closely related to
the operation and=or reputation of the organization (M¼ 4.46, SD¼ 1.67); and it denied
responsibility in the crisis (M¼ 1.25, SD¼ 1.03). For the Wal-Mart case, the organization per-
ceived the crisis as somewhat closely related with the organization’s goals, but not essentially
relevant to the operation and=or reputation of the organization (M¼ 5.94, SD¼ 1.48); and it par-
tially assumed responsibility (M¼ 5.59, SD¼ 1.42).
Based on the results, evidence suggests that even though organizations may be highly
engaged in the crises, they were less likely to assume responsibility for the crises. Evidence sug-
gests remaining neutral or veering from assuming responsibility appeared to be commonly prac-
ticed. Among the 14 cases, there was only one case where an organization admitted
responsibility.
Primary Publics’ Coping Strategies
RQ3 examined the primary publics’ coping strategies, as evident in the news coverage (see
Table 3 for the summary of key findings by quadrants and crisis cases).
Quadrant 1. For the HP case, the primary publics tended to use more conative coping
(M¼ 5.14, SD¼ 1.09) than cognitive coping (M¼ 4.53, SD¼ 1.19; t¼ 3.85, p< .001). For the
Dell case, there was no significant difference in the primary publics’ coping strategy. For the Sago
Mining case, the primary publics tended to use more conative coping (M¼ 4.79, SD¼ .78) than
cognitive coping (M¼ 3.96, SD¼ 1.33; t¼ 2.78, p< .05). For the Ford case, the primary publics
tended to use more conative coping (M¼ 4.64, SD¼ .96) than cognitive coping (M¼ 4.27,
TABLE 3
Continued
Quadrant 4 Quadrant 3
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 5.33, SD¼ .71; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 3.44,
SD¼ 2.19)
. Organization moderately engaged (Goal relevance:
M¼ 4.00, SD¼ .82; Crisis responsibility: M¼ 3.90,
SD¼ .99)
Note. p< .05.p< .01.p< .001. þp< .10.
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SD¼ 1.21; t¼ 2.43, p< .05). For the CIA case, the primary publics tended to use more conative
coping (M¼ 5.40, SD¼ .65) than cognitive coping (M¼ 4.74, SD¼ 1.13; t¼ 4.70, p< .001).
Except for the case involving Dell, the primary publics in all the other cases were more willing
to take actions to address the crisis, i.e., engage in conative coping.
Quadrant 2. For the US Airways’ takeover bid of Delta Air Lines case, the primary publics
tended to use more conative coping (M¼ 4.94, SD¼ 1.20) than cognitive coping (M¼ 3.35,
SD¼ 1.37; t¼ 3.70, p< .01). For the Ameren’s power outage case, the primary publics also
tended to use more conative coping (M¼ 5.33, SD¼ .1.03) than cognitive coping (M¼ 4.33,
SD¼ .82; t¼ 2.74, p< .05). For the BP case, there was no significant difference in the primary
publics’ coping strategy.
Quadrant 3. Across the cases in this quadrant, there was no significant difference in the
primary publics’ coping strategy.
Quadrant 4. For the Amtrak case, the primary publics tended to use more cognitive coping
(M¼ 3.67, SD¼ 2.60) than conative coping (M¼ 3.11, SD¼ 2.57; t¼ 1.89, p< .10). For the T.
J. MAXX case, the primary publics tended to use more conative coping (M¼ 5.59, SD¼ 2.28)
than cognitive coping (M¼ 3.94, SD¼ 1.18; t¼ 2.08, p< .10). For the Wal-Mart case, there was
no significant difference in the primary publics’ coping strategy.
Accordingly, there was strong evidence of publics engaging in conative coping. Among the
four quadrants examined, three of the quadrants showed evidence of conative coping and one
showed no significant difference in coping strategies used.
Difference in Perception of Organization Engagement
RQ4 examined if there was any difference in perception in the degree in organization engage-
ment in each of the crises between the organization and its primary publics (see Table 4 for the
summary of key findings by quadrants and crisis cases).
Quadrant 1. For the HP case, the primary publics perceived the organization’s goals were
more relevant to the crisis (M¼ 4.17, SD¼ 1.09) than the organization perceived itself
(M¼ 3.63, SD¼ .99; t¼ 2.71, p< .05). The primary publics also perceived the organization
had higher crisis responsibility for the crisis (M¼ 4.33, SD¼ .93) than the organization
appraised itself (M¼ 3.70, SD¼ 1.09; t¼ 3.91, p< .001). For the Sago Mining case, the primary
publics perceived the organization’s goals as more relevant to the crisis (M¼ 5.60, SD¼ .70)
than the organization perceived itself (M¼ 4.40, SD¼ .70; t¼ 3.34, p< .01). The primary pub-
lics also perceived the organization had higher crisis responsibility for the crisis (M¼ 4.55,
SD¼ 1.22) than the organization appraised itself (M¼ 3.73, SD¼ .99; t¼ 2.81, p< .05). For
the Dell, Ford and the immigration cases, there was no significant difference in perception
between the organization and the primary publics.
Quadrant 2. For the US Airways’ takeover bid of Delta Air Lines case, the primary publics
perceived the organization’s goals as more relevant to the crisis (M¼ 5.44, SD¼ .63) than the
organization perceived itself (M¼ 4.25, SD¼ .58; t¼ 4.84, p< .001), but there was no differ-
ence in how the organization and the primary publics perceived the organizational crisis
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TABLE 4
Public–Organization Crisis Response Perception Gap by Integrated Crisis Mapping Quadrants
Quadrant 1 Quadrant 2
Reputation: HP case Economic=Hostile takeovers: US Airways’ takeover case
. Public coping preference . Public coping preference
 Publics more willing to take cognitive coping than
the organization
 Publics more willing to take conative coping than
the organization
 Publics more willing to take conative coping than
the organization
. Organizational engagement
. Organizational engagement  Publics perceive more organizational goal
relevance than the organization
 Publics perceive more organizational goal relevance
than the organization
Natural disasters: Ameren case
 Publics perceive more organizational crisis
responsibility than the organization
. Public coping preference (n.s.)
Technological Breakdown: Dell Case . Organizational engagement
. Public coping preference  Publics perceive more organizational crisis
responsibility than the organizationþ
 Organization more willing to take conative coping
than publics
Accidents: BP case
. Organizational engagement (n.s.) . Public coping preference
Industrial matters: Sago Mine case  Organization more willing to take conative coping
than publics
. Public coping preference (n.s.) . Organizational engagement (n.s.)
. Organizational engagement
 Publics perceive more organizational goal relevance
than the organization
 Publics perceive more organizational crisis
responsibility than the organization
Labor unrest=Protest: Ford case
. Public coping preference
 Organization more willing to take conative coping
than publics
. Organizational engagement (n.s.)
Regulation=Legislation: CIA case
. Public coping preference
 Publics more willing to take cognitive coping than
the organization
 Publics more willing to take conative coping than
the organization
. Organizational engagement (ns)
Quadrant 4 Quadrant 3
Security issues: T. J. MAXX case Psychopathic acts=Terrorism: Virginia Tech shooting case
. Public coping preference . Public coping preference (ns)
 Publics more willing to take cognitive coping than
the organization
. Organizational engagement (ns)
. Organizational engagement Rumors: Gonzales resignation case
 Publics perceive more organizational goal relevance
than the organization
. Public coping preference
(Continued )
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responsibility. For Ameren’s handling of the power outage, there was no difference in how the
organization and the primary publics perceived the goal relevance of the crisis to the organiza-
tion; the primary publics seemed to perceive higher organizational crisis responsibility
(M¼ 4.75, SD¼ .50) than the organization perceived itself (M¼ 4.00, SD¼ .82; t¼ 3.00,
p< .10). For the BP case, there was no significant difference in the perception of the degree
in organization’s goal relevance and crisis responsibility.
Quadrant 3. For the Gonzalez case, the primary publics perceived the organization’s goals
as more relevant to the crisis (M¼ 4.00, SD¼ .50) than the organization perceived itself
(M¼ 2.67, SD¼ .50; t¼ 4.62, p< .01). The primary publics also perceived the organization
had higher crisis responsibility for the crisis (M¼ 4.40, SD¼ .84) than the organization
appraised itself (M¼ 2.30, SD¼ .48; t¼ 7.58, p< .001). For the Merck CEO retirement and Vir-
ginia Tech shooting cases, there was no significant difference in the perception of the degree in
organization’s goal relevance and crisis responsibility in each of the crises between the organi-
zation and the primary publics.
Quadrant 4. For the Amtrak case, the primary publics perceived the organization’s goals as
more relevant to the crisis (M¼ 6.14, SD¼ .69) than the organization perceived itself (M¼ 5.43,
SD¼ .79; t¼ 1.99, p< .10). The primary publics perceived higher organizational crisis responsi-
bility (M¼ 6.57, SD¼ .54) than the organization perceived itself (M¼ 2.86, SD¼ 2.12; t¼ 4.77,
p< .01). For the T. J. MAXX case, the primary publics perceived the organization’s goals as more
relevant to the crisis (M¼ 6.22, SD¼ .73) than the organization perceived itself (M¼ 4.61,
SD¼ 1.42; t¼ 5.50, p< .001). There was no significant difference in the perception of the orga-
nization’s crisis responsibility between the organization and the primary publics. For theWal-Mart
case, there was no significant difference in the perception of the organization’s goal relevance in
TABLE 4
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Quadrant 4 Quadrant 3
Human resource: Wal-Mart case  Publics more willing to take cognitive coping than
the organization
. Public coping preference . Organizational engagement
 Publics more willing to take cognitive coping than
the organization
 Publics perceive more organizational goal relevance
than the organization
. Organizational engagement  Publics perceive more organizational crisis
responsibility than the organization
 Publics perceive more organizational crisis
responsibility than the organization
CEO retirement: Merck case
Transport failure: Amtrak case . Public coping preference (ns)
. Public coping preference (ns) . Organizational engagement (ns)
. Organizational engagement
 Publics perceive more organizational goal relevance
than the organizationþ
 Publics perceive more organizational crisis
responsibility than the organization
Note. p< .05.p< .01.p< .001. þp< .10.
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crisis, and the primary publics perceived higher organizational crisis responsibility (M¼ 6.64,
SD¼ .50) than the organization perceived itself (M¼ 5.57, SD¼ 1.56; t¼ 2.79, p< .05).
Based on the results, evidence suggests that organizations should assume higher responsi-
bility for the crises. The difference was in the degree of how the publics felt. In quadrant
one, for instance, there was strong evidence that the publics felt the organization should assume
higher responsibility. In quadrants two, three, and four, the publics did not feel that as strongly.
Difference in Coping Strategy Perception
RQ5 examined if there was any difference in perception in the degree of the publics’ coping
strategy between the organization and the publics (see Table 4 for the summary of key findings
by quadrants and crisis cases).
Quadrant 1. For the HP case, the primary publics were more willing to take cognitive
coping (M¼ 4.53, SD¼ 1.20) than the organization (M¼ 3.86, SD¼ 1.26; t¼ 3.13, p< .01)
perceived. The primary publics were also more willing to take conative coping (M¼ 5.14,
SD¼ 1.09) than the organization (M¼ 4.46, SD¼ 1.33; t¼ 3.44, p< .01) perceived. The same
pattern occurred in the immigration case leading to the Military Commissions Act 2006, where
the primary publics were more willing to take cognitive coping (M¼ 4.74, SD¼ 1.13) than the
organization (M¼ 3.98, SD¼ .99; t¼ 4.07, p< .001) perceived. The primary publics were also
more willing to take conative coping (M¼ 5.40, SD¼ .65) than the organization (M¼ 4.91,
SD¼ 1.20; t¼ 2.49, p< .05) perceived. It appears that the primary publics in these two cases
were more active than the organizations in taking efforts to change opinions and the crisis situa-
tions. For the Dell case, there was no significant difference in the cognitive coping strategy
between the primary publics and the organization (t¼ 1.48, ns). Interestingly, the organization
was more willing to engage in conative coping (M¼ 5.92, SD¼ .80) than the primary publics
(M¼ 4.17, SD¼ 1.19; t¼ 3.78, p< .01). For the Ford case, there was no significant difference
in the cognitive coping strategy between the primary publics and the organization (t¼ 1.44, ns).
Again, the organization was more willing to engage in conative coping (M¼ 5.44, SD¼ .91)
than the primary publics (M¼ 4.63, SD¼ .98; t¼ 3.66, p< .01). It appears that the organizations
in these two cases were more active than the primary publics in making efforts to deal with the
crisis situations. For the Sago Mining case, there was no significant difference in the cognitive
and conative coping strategies taken between the primary publics and the organization (t¼ 1.48,
n.s.; t¼ 1.00, ns, respectively).
Quadrant 2. For the BP case, there was no significant difference in the cognitive coping
strategy between the primary publics and the organization. Interestingly, the organization was
more willing to engage in conative coping (M¼ 5.57, SD¼ .51) than the primary publics
(M¼ 4.86, SD¼ .86; t¼ 3.24, p< .01). For the US Airways’ takeover bid of Delta Air Lines
case, there was no significant difference in the cognitive coping strategy between the primary
publics and the organization, and the primary publics seemed to be more willing to engage in
conative coping (M¼ 4.94, SD¼ 1.20) than the organization (M¼ 4.41, SD¼ 1.23; t¼ 2.05,
p< .10). For the Ameren case, there was no significant difference in the cognitive and conative
coping strategies between the primary publics and the organization.
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Quadrant 3. For the Gonzalez case, the primary publics were more willing to engage in
cognitive coping (M¼ 4.10, SD¼ 1.10) than the organization (M¼ 3.00, SD¼ .00; t¼ 3.16,
p< .05). However, there is no significant difference in the conative strategy between the primary
publics and the organization. For Merck CEO retirement and Virginia Tech shooting cases, there
was no significant difference in the cognitive and conative coping strategies between the primary
publics and the organization.
Quadrant 4. For the Amtrak case, there was no significant difference in the cognitive or
conative coping strategies between the primary publics and the organization. For the T. J.
MAXX case, there was no significant difference in the conative coping strategy between the pri-
mary publics and the organization, and the primary publics seemed to be more willing to engage
in cognitive coping (M¼ 3.72, SD¼ 2.30) than the organization (M¼ 1.89, SD¼ 1.71)
(t¼ 3.53, p< .05). For the Wal-Mart case, there was no significant difference in the conative
coping strategy between the primary publics and the organization; the primary publics seemed
to be more willing to engage in cognitive coping (M¼ 6.23, SD¼ 1.36) than the organization
(M¼ 5.69, SD¼ 1.03) (t¼ 2.21, p< .05).
DISCUSSION
This process of testing the theoretical robustness and ecological validity of the ICM model
through the multistage testing has yielded the following insights (see Figure 2).
Publics’ Emotional Response: Anxiety as Default Emotion and New Variations of
Emotions
Across the four quadrants and 14 cases, evidence suggests strong merit that anxiety is the default
emotion in most, if not all, crises posited in the model, as the primary level emotion which the
publics experience in the immediate instance. Anxiety could even be argued as the default domi-
nant emotion.
Quadrant 1. In crises that require high organization engagement, and conative coping by
the publics, the ICM model had posited the existence of two emotions: anger as the
primary-level emotion and anxiety as the secondary-level emotion. Our findings showed that
anger and anxiety were evident in three of the five cases in this quadrant. Of the three, two
showed that it was associated or coexisted with the other. Of the two emotions posited, anxiety
was evident in all the cases studied, mostly as primary-level emotion; anger was present in three
of the five cases, either as primary or secondary level emotions. Another emotion, which we had
posited in another quadrant, sadness, was evident in two of the five cases. Evidence suggests
strong merit in the existence of three variants of emotions, instead of two, in this quadrant.
Quadrant 2. In crises that require high organization engagement and cognitive coping by
the publics, the ICM model had posited sadness as the primary level emotion and fright as
the secondary level emotion. There is insufficient evidence to conclude if sadness or fright
should be the next dominant emotion. At best, we could argue that evidence suggested some
merit that sadness, anger, and fright coexist as next-level emotions.
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Quadrant 3. In crises that require low organization engagement and cognitive coping by
the publics, the ICM model had posited fright as the dominant emotion and sadness as the
secondary-level emotion. Fright was the next level emotion followed by traces of sadness and
anger. At best, we could argue that evidence suggested some merit that fright and anger co-exist
as the next level emotions.
Quadrant 4. In crises that require low organization engagement and conative coping by the
publics, the ICM model had posited anxiety as the primary-level emotion and anger as the
secondary-level emotion. Our findings showed anxiety as the dominant emotion, followed by
different variations of anger, which was posited, and sadness, which was not posited. The
emotion of fright, which was not posited, was found to be present.
Publics’ Coping Strategy: Cognitive Processing Vs. Conative Manifestations
Evidence suggests strong merit that publics in crises engage in manifest conative coping.
Cognitive coping remains latent.
Quadrant 1. In this quadrant, the ICM model had posited that the publics engage more in
conative than cognitive coping. Findings showed that in four of the five cases, the publics
engaged in conative coping and were willingness to take action to manage their perception of
the crisis situation. Consequently, findings also showed that because they were willing to take
proactive steps, these publics expected the organizations to do likewise and similarly engage
in conative coping strategies to deal with the crises. Evidence thus suggests strong merit in
the publics engaging in conative coping.
Quadrant 2. The ICM model had posited that the publics engage more in cognitive coping.
Findings showed there were no significant differences in the coping strategies used. Evidence
suggests some merit that publics engage in conative rather than cognitive coping.
Quadrant 3. The ICM model had posited that the publics engage in cognitive coping. Find-
ings showed there were no significant differences in the coping strategies used. Evidence sug-
gests some merit that publics engage in conative rather than cognitive coping.
Quadrant 4. The ICM model had posited that the publics engage in conative coping. Find-
ings, however, showed that the publics engage in cognitive, rather than conative, coping. The
collective evidence of publics engaging in cognitive coping in this quadrant have persuaded
us to argue that cognitive coping still exists, as posited in the model, despite the lack of evidence
in quadrants one to three.
The question remains, how does one make sense of the data and explain the interaction
between cognitive and conative coping? Three conjectures are proffered. First, even though
assiduous attention was paid to capturing cognitive coping in content analysis of news coverage,
measured by the extent to which the publics were addressing or readdressing their perspective of
the crises from news reports, it appears that the methodological limitations could have limited
the emergence of such a theme. During a crisis, action-oriented stories, or conative-based stra-
tegies in ICM terminology, are often preferred, and recorded, in place of stories that investigated
into the psyche and thought processes of publics in most media reports. Second, based on this
argument, it is conceivable that most of the conative coping mechanisms that have been captured
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were the culmination of the internal processing that had taken place (cognitive), leading the pub-
lics to take action to deal with the crises (conative). Evidently, the active conative coping dis-
played is thus the outcome of cognitive processing that had taken place, which was not
captured in news reports. Third, if indeed this is the case, it is also conceivable to argue that
cognitive coping takes place first before conative coping. One sorts out and makes sense of
the uncertainty of crisis within oneself first before one takes action to deal with the situation.
This is probably how human beings work when dealing with personal crises like a broken
relationship. Denial, anger, sense of loss, and isolation are all emotions that take place within
oneself first before one takes steps to manage the grief, either through the setting up of new rou-
tines, making new friends, embarking on a new lifestyle, or even moving to a new town. There-
fore, we argue that evidence suggests strong merit that conative coping is the external
manifestation of the internal cognitive processing that has already taken place. The issue then
is not a question of the presence of conative versus the absence of cognitive coping. Instead,
we argue that cognitive coping is the antecedent of conative coping.
Organization Engagement: Variance in Organization Engagement
Quadrant 1. Although we had posited in our model that organizations should be highly
engaged, findings showed otherwise. In all of the five cases studied, the organizations main-
tained that the crises did not relate or affect their operations or reputations; they did not think
they were fully responsible for the crises, and they engaged in a neutral stance with regards
to dealing or resolving the crises. These appeared to dovetail with the publics’ perception of
organization engagement. In three of the five cases studied, the publics shared similar percep-
tions with the organizations regarding the level of engagement of the organization. Only in
two of the five cases did the publics desire the organizations to do more. Evidence thus suggests
strong merit that organizations embroiled in these crises need not be highly engaged. A moderate
level of engagement appeared to suffice, based on the evidence.
Quadrant 2. The ICM model had posited that organizations need to be highly engaged.
Evidence found some merit that organizations battling the crises posited here should be highly
engaged. Even though, in two of the three crises, organizations examined considered the crises
they faced somewhat related to their goals; and in all the three crises, they did not regard the
crises as having massive impacts on their reputations; and only in one of the three crises did
the organization admit responsibility for the crisis. The perceptions of the publics showed other-
wise. In two of the three cases there, the publics either perceived the organization’s goals as
more relevant to the crisis than the organization perceived or the publics perceived the organi-
zation should assume higher crisis responsibility than the organization perceived.
Quadrant 3. The ICM model had posited that organizations need not be highly engaged.
Evidence offered minimal support that organizations here need to increase its level of engage-
ment. In two of three cases, organizations battling the crises in this quadrant felt that the crises
were related to their organizational goals, but did not regard the crises as having any impact on
their reputations, and that they did not admit responsibility for the crises. As far as the publics
were concerned, there were no significant differences in the perception of organization engage-
ment between the organizations and their publics in two of the three cases. The publics did per-
ceive, in one of the three cases, that the organizations should assume higher responsibility than
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the organizations had appraised themselves, but there was insufficient evidence to recommend
increased engagement by the organizations.
Quadrant 4. The ICM model had posited that organizations need not be highly engaged.
Evidence found some merit that organizations battling the crises posited here should be more
engaged with publics. Evidence suggested strong merit that organizations examined considered
the crises they faced relevant to their organizational goals but they did not regard the crises as
having massive impacts on their operations. They also denied responsibility for the crises. The
perceptions of the publics, however, showed otherwise. In two of the three cases, the publics
perceived the organizations’ goals as relevant to the crises than the organization perceived. Simi-
larly, the publics also perceived the organizations should assume higher crisis responsibility than
the organizations perceived.
Thus, although both the publics and the organizations agreed that the crises were relevant to
the organizations’ goals, they differed on who should assume more responsibility. Organizations
often fear assuming responsibility because, as Benoit (2004) argued, this would exacerbate legal
liabilities. Instead, organizations could still reach out to publics if they were seen to be more
engaged in these crises regardless of whether they felt they were responsible for the crises. This
is because, as Coombs (2007) argued, crisis is perceptual. If this ‘‘threatens the expectancies of
the stakeholders’’ (p. 3), it invariably would impact how the publics regard the organization in
the long run. Benoit and Pang (2008) argued that as long as the audience thinks the firm is at
fault, organizational image is at risk.
CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
This study represents a multistage testing to investigate the viability of the ICM model by inte-
grating crisis perspectives with psychological analyses, which allows us to generate what Yin
(2003) termed ‘‘analytic generalization’’ (p. 33). Analytic generalization is achieved by testing
empirically a theoretical model to enhance its potency and rigor. Analytic generalization, or what
Bennett (2004) called ‘‘theory confirming and infirming’’ (p. 22), is achieved when ‘‘two or
more cases’’ support the theoretical assertions (Yin, 2003, p. 33). Although much of what the
authors have been studying is still exploratory, findings suggested theoretical rigor in the model
with room for further refinements.
Admittedly, one limitation of this study is that the analyses are all based on media reports.
First, given the small number of articles that were relevant and available through online data-
base, we acknowledge it raises questions about validity and the stories’ representativeness of
the case. We also realize that the statistical power of detecting associations among the coding
variables could be restricted. The stories themselves do not represent the entire crisis case
(we never intended it to be). Instead, we argue that our findings provide valuable insights to
how the model works and where it falls short. We concede that triangulation of media reports
and first ethnographic studies of both the organizations and publics, for instance, would help
shed more light. However, given the exploratory nature of the research, we argue it is a
limitation we have to accept.
Second, this study excluded media releases and letters or opinion section of newspapers that
might have provided valuable information on the organization’s crisis strategies, as well as the
publics’ expression of emotions. Further research could first, use more in-depth case analysis
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approach to examine how the individual crisis evolved, what was the level of organization
engagement, and how the publics respond emotionally. Future research could also include exam-
ination of messages disseminated through media releases, as well as interviews with practitioners
and focus groups with publics involved in the respective crises. Analysis could dive into analyz-
ing emotional expressions. These emotions could then be validated and triangulated through
interviews and experiments so as validate the publics’ affective responses in a given crisis situ-
ation. We plan to follow up on this research by not only testing the ICM model by examining
other mediums (broadcast, YouTube, and other social media platforms), but also triangulating
the findings of our case analyses using experimental designs, in-depth interviews and surveys.
Third, our reliance on content analysis of media reports that are filtered through the eyes of
journalists who may frame issues according to their perceptions of what had happened. In this
regard, we argue that, due to the rapidity, abruptness, and volatility in each of the crises, and the
exigency and imperativeness for organizations to respond to the crisis, analysis of news coverage
would provide an expeditious and fair representation of what had happened since our studies
centered on the height of the crisis, i.e., the first month(s) of the crisis. Studying news coverage
is one way to capture the unfolding drama of the crises (Kaid, 1996). Indeed, previous works
analyzing crises through media coverage had proved insightful (for instance, see Jin et al.,
2006; Meng & Berger, 2008; Reber, Cropp, & Cameron, 2003; Shin et al., 2005). Even though
there may have been elements of bias and subjectivity in some of these news reports, we believe
that examining prestige newspapers would project a fair representation of what had happened
(Krippendorf, 2004; Riffe, Lacy, & Fico, 1998). For instance, Carey (2003), in analyzing the
uses of media in reporting the 9=11 crisis, had described media reportage of the crisis as
‘‘robust’’ (p. 6). Our rationale is that with every quick turn of events during the crisis, the media,
particularly the prestige newspapers, would be at the forefront of reporting the crisis. Noll (2003)
argued that media content may be studied to ‘‘verify assumptions of content’’ (p. xviii), and we
argue that, in our verification of content, we had examined beyond media framing to distilling in
its fundamental forms the key ingredients in each crisis with the primary goal of shedding light
on our model, not to prove or disprove media biases. Besides, any potential media bias would
have been detected and accounted for by analyzing data from not one, but five, newspapers. Our
intention was not just to capture the rapidly unfolding communication between the organizations
and their publics as enumerated in documents of public record; we humbly submit that the
ongoing public discourse would reflect, to a large extent, an accurate and present reading of
the reality. Even with the inherent methodological limitations, these limitations should not
invalidate our findings.
Another limitation lies in the reliance on keywords searches in online databases, which might
have encountered ‘‘wire-service blind spots’’ in news archives (Weaver & Bimber¸2008, p.
515), which limited the number of relevant news stories that could have been included and ana-
lyzed. For example, as Weaver and Bimber (2008) found, ‘‘inter-database agreement between
Google News and LexisNexis ranged from 29% to 83%’’ (p. 515) comparing story searches
among eight large-circulation US newspapers, which might result in ‘‘much of the discrepancy
due to wire service exclusions: LexisNexis missed half or more of stories appearing in major
papers and in broad searches of English-language news because it is blind to wire stories’’
(p. 515). This is another limitation we accept.
Limitations aside, what are the bigger implications and insights this model avail to practi-
tioners? We suggest three. First, organizations should incorporate strategies to manage the likely
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emotions publics may face even before the crisis happens, in the strategic phase where issues
needed to be managed. Wilcox and Cameron (2009) argued that a crisis life cycle undergoes four
phases, proactive, strategic, reactive and recovery stages. Issues management is in the strategic
phase, before crisis hits in the reactive phase. Issues management has largely focused on the
threats identified and tasks at hand, but little on the emotions of the publics. Emotions of the
publics ought to be factored into practitioners’ considerations. Second, even though evidence
suggests publics take active steps to manage the crisis, or conative coping, organizations may
consider making available resources for the publics to manage their situations better. For laid-off
workers who are likely to feel anxious for the future, for instance, organizations can hire a
recruitment agency to explore other employment possibilities. This will aid in the conative cop-
ing process. Third, organizations have been known to be careful or slow in assuming responsi-
bility. Where culpability is clear, organizations should have the courage to do what is morally
right, to admit fault and promise to correct the mistake (Benoit, 2004). When the organization
tells the truth, publics are likely to forgive (Wharton & Peltz, 2009).
Last, it is our thesis that studies analyzing emotions in crises should increasingly dominate
crisis scholarship for the simple argument that organizational strategies would be ineffectual
if these do not appeal to the hearts and minds of the publics the organizations are trying to reach.
Our emotion-based conceptualization is positioned as a nascent attempt to understand crisis from
the perspectives of the publics so that organizational strategies and responses can be more appro-
priately targeted and honed. Both organizations and their publics respond not only intellectually,
but emotionally, to the events around them that shape the reputation and future of their own lives
to a greater or a lesser extent. In addition, emotions other than anger, sadness, frights, and anxi-
ety should be further explored to help researchers and practitioners fully understand the hearts of
the publics in crises.
Much work remains to be done. The findings from this study represent the imprints of an
initial trail that may open up to a possibly new vista of research, with the potential of transform-
ing the landscape of studies of crisis communication.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF CRISIS CASES SELECTED FOR CRISIS
TYPES MAPPED IN ICM
Quadrant 1
Hewlett Packard case. This is an example of reputational crisis. HP’s internal leak crisis
became public September 6, 2006 when the company filed documents with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Media coverage on the leak investigation lasted for months, but the arti-
cles analyzed focused on coverage until September 22, 2006, the day that the chairwoman of the
board Patricia Dunn resigned.
Story Collection: The population of HP news stories were obtained from September 6 to 22, 2006.
News stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (HP, H-P, and Hewlett
Packard). Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 82.
Dell case. This is an example of technology breakdown. The crisis surrounding Dell’s battery
recall began on August 14, 2006 with the organization’s official announcement of the recall. The
recall was voluntary and lasted until September 29, 2006 when the company announced an update
on the situation. The majority of news coverage occurred during the first 2 weeks of the recall.
Story Collection: The population of Dell news stories were obtained from August 14 to September
30, 2006, from the first official communication by Dell to one day after the last release on the topic
by Dell. News stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (Dell and battery).
Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 20.
Sago mining case. This is an example of industrial matters. Media coverage of the Sago
Mining accident began on January 4, 2005 with the statement given by the mine’s owner ICG
Group Inc. The bulk of media coverage occurred from January 6 to 13, 2006.
Story Collection: The population of stories was accessed from January 4 to February 1, 2006, from
the first official announcement from ICG to the last official statement by ICG on the crisis. News
stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (Sago mine and ICG). Stories
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that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 27.
Ford case. This is an example of labor unrest=protest. Media coverage of the Ford job
cutback crisis began on May 11, 2006, as newspapers reported on the mounting struggle of
American automobile producers to keep pace with foreign competitors. Coverage intensified
in August and September, following Ford’s announcements that it would implement massive
production cuts and manufacturing plant closings, as well as the buyout or layoff of tens of
thousands of workers, as part of a massive corporate restructuring plan.
Story Collection: The population of Ford news stories were obtained from May 10 to September 20,
2006. The news stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (Ford and jobs).
Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 69.
Military Commissions Act 2006. This is an example of regulation=deregulation. The
Central Intelligence Agency’s crisis regarding the treatment of suspected terrorist conspirators
imprisoned at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, began on July 12, 2006. Responding to allegations of
physical torture and unethical interrogation of detainees, American media questioned whether
the constitutional rights of prisoners should be extended to alleged terrorists held abroad. Presi-
dent Bush and his administration acknowledged the existence of secret CIA prisons hosted by
foreign governments, but declined to confirm the exact locations of these facilities.
Story Collection: The population of CIA releases and news stories were searched from July 12 to
November 4, 2006. News stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords
(CIA and Guantanamo) and stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 61.
Quadrant 2
US Airways’ takeover bid of Delta Air Lines. This is an example of an economic=hostile
takeover. In an effort to become the largest airline in the world, US Airways made an audacious
US$8.5 billion bid for the Delta Air Lines in November 2006, even though Delta had rebuffed
earlier advances a few months earlier in the summer. Undeterred, US Airways, which operates
a vast network of both international and domestic routes, this time made an unsolicited offer to
the creditors of Delta, which was operating under bankruptcy protection. Delta was the
fourth-largest domestic airline in the United States. US Airways took the hostile takeover further
by presenting its case to the Delta creditors even as Delta was trying to shore up support from its
creditors that it would emerge from the bankruptcy protection as stand-alone company. The bat-
tle, however, did not last for long. US Airways withdrew its improved US$10.2 billion offer
after it failed to win the support of Delta creditors, which included the Boeing Company and
the federal pension agency, in January 2007.
Story Collection: The population of stories about this hostile takeover were obtained from November
2006 to January 2007. News stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (US
Airways, Delta Air Lines, and takeover). Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually fil-
tered to 20.
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Ameren deals with power outages. This is an example of an organization dealing with
crisis as a result of natural disaster. Thousands of residents in Missouri and Illinois went without
power for nearly a week in the cold of the winter after a nasty storm plowed through the
Midwest in early December 2006. At least 19 deaths were blamed on the storm. However, it
was the St. Louis-based Ameren Corp’s dealing of this natural disaster that came under scrutiny.
Missouri Governor Matt Blunt described Ameren’s handling of the crisis as ‘‘unacceptable.’’
‘‘Missourians expect and should receive reliable service from their utility companies,’’ he said
(‘‘Nation in brief,’’ 2006). Illinois Lieutenant Governor Pat Quinn called for utility regulators to
investigate into the lingering power disruptions. Despite Ameren’s insistence that it had poured
every available resource into rectifying the power outage, residents remained outraged.
Story Collection: The population of stories about the handling of this natural disaster were obtained
from coverage in December 2006, and uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (power
outage, storms, and Ameren). Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 14.
BP refinery blast. This is an example of an accident. On March 23, 2005, a powerful
explosion rocked BP’s refining complex in Texas City, Texas, about 35miles southeast of
downtown Houston, injuring more than 100 people and killing 15 people. The blast occurred
on the western side of the sprawling 1,200-acre complex in one of the units used to make
high-grade fuels. According to a BP report, operators overfilled and overheated a processing
tower at a unit that housed hydrocarbon liquid and vapor. The liquid and vapor mix overpressur-
ized, flooded into an adjacent stack, and escaped into the atmosphere. The resulting vapor cloud
was ignited by an unknown source. The report added that it was human error. BP quickly admit-
ted fault for the blast.
Story Collection: The population of stories about this blast were obtained from coverage in March
2005, and uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (BP, refinery, explosion, and blast).
Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 18.
Quadrant 3
Virginia Tech shooting. This is an example of a psychopathic act=terrorism. In what was
described as the deadliest shooting rampage in American history, a gunman, Seung-Hui Cho,
embarked on two shooting attacks at Virginia Tech University in April 2007, killing 32 and
injuring at least 15. There was a 2-hr gap between the first shootings, when two people were
killed, and the second, when Cho stalked through the halls of an engineering building across
campus, shooting at professors and students in classrooms and hallways, firing dozens of rounds.
Cho, described as a loner, filmed himself in-between the attacks. In a video sent to NBC and
later broadcast, Cho vented his hatred of other students and his grandiose self-view. He killed
himself after the second attack.
Story Collection: The population of stories about this psychopathic act were obtained from coverage
in April 2007, and uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (Virginia Tech and gun-
man). Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 16.
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Rumors of Gonzales resignation. This is an example of crisis generated by rumor. For-
mer US Attorney-General Alberto R. Gonzales’ troubles intensified from March 2007 when
questions were asked of the Justice Department surrounding the ouster of eight United States
attorneys and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s use of expanded surveillance powers
to improperly obtain personal records of citizens. A leading Democrat, Senator Charles E.
Schumer, Democrat of New York, began to call for his resignation. Gonzales initially responded
by claiming he was ‘‘not involved in any discussions about what was going on,’’ only to con-
cede later at a Senate hearing that he knew about them, although he did not select any of the
prosecutors slated for dismissal in 2006 (Eggen, 2007). He claimed he had delegated the effort
to his former chief of staff, D. Kyle Sampson. From March to April, rumors were rife as to
whether he would resign even as he was fighting hard to keep his job. Gonzales did resign after
all, on August 27, 2007.
Story Collection: The population of stories about this rumor were obtained from March to August
2007, and uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (Gonzales, attorney general, step
down, and resign). Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 18.
Merck CEO retires. This is an example of a crisis generated as a result of CEO retirement. A
popular pain and arthritis drug that was consumed by millions worldwide since it launched in
1999, Vioxx, which chalked up global sales amounting to US$2.5 billion in 2003 alone, was with-
drawn from the market on September 30, 2004. Merck & Co, which manufactured the drug, with-
drew it after a trial showed that those who took 25mg of Vioxx daily for more than 18 months
were twice as likely to suffer a heart attack or stroke as those on placebo. The withdrawal was
described as the largest voluntary drug recall in history. Merck said the withdrawal was to protect
patients from further risks. However, the onslaught of criticism from the medical fraternity, law-
suits by patients, and investigations by the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, continued. In May 2005, CEO Raymond Gilmartin, who, by far, had been Merck’s
most prominent defender in the controversy, resigned abruptly. Merck said he retired.
Story Collection: The population of stories about Gilmartin’s retirement were obtained from cover-
age from October 2004 to May 2005. News stories were uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the
keywords (Merck, Vioxx, CEO, retirement, and Gilmartin). Stories that were relevant to the crisis
were eventually filtered to 10.
Quadrant 4
T. J. MAXX case. This is an example of security issue. In Dec 18, 2006, apparel retailer
discovered suspicious software on its computers and began investigation. Three days later,
the company concluded that a breach had probably occurred and that the intruder was still on
the system. The next day, it notified federal investigators. On Dec 27, the firm learned that cus-
tomer data had been stolen, and it notified banks and check-processing companies. The extent of
the intrusion was disclosed in March 2007. Hackers had swiped US$45.7 million of its credit
and debit card transaction records.
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Story Collection: The population of stories about this case were obtained from coverage from
January 2007 to September 2008, and uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (TJ
MAXX, breach, and investigation). Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered
to 25.
Wal-Mart case. This is an example of a human resource crisis. The case dates back to June
2001, when six former and current female Wal-Mart employees accused the retail giant of deny-
ing women equal pay and opportunities for promotion. On June 21, 2004, a federal judge in San
Francisco ruled that the case could proceed as a class action. On February 6, 2007, a federal
appeals court in San Francisco ruled that the case should proceed as a class action. Wal-Mart
Stores Inc. lost a bid to have an appeals court reconsider its decision to allow 2 million current
and former female workers to sue as a group with sex-bias claims.
Story Collection: The population of stories about this case were obtained from June 2001 to
September 2008, and uploaded from Lexis-Nexis by typing in the keywords (Wal-Mart, employee,
and sex bias). Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to 31.
Amtrak case. This is an example of transport failure. An Amtrak power outage during the
busy morning commute disrupted all rail traffic between Washington and New York on May 25,
2006, stranding commuters on Amtrak and MARC train lines and causing a ripple of cancella-
tions and delays throughout the morning. The power outage, which originated at a substation in
Pennsylvania, began shortly after 8 a.m. and ended about 10:15 a.m.
Story Collection: The population of stories about this case were obtained from coverage from May
26, 2006 to Dec 31, 2006. Stories that were relevant to the crisis were eventually filtered to13 stories.
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APPENDIX B
Primary Publics in Crisis News Across Integrated Crisis Mapping (ICM) Quadrant 1–4
ICM Quadrant 1 ICM Quadrant 2 ICM Quadrant 3 ICM Quadrant 4
HP Case BP Case Merck Case TJ MAXX Case
Employees Victims=Victims’
families
Employees TJX customers
Governmental agencies Local community Shareholders Investigators (government
investigation)
Shareholders General public Governmental officials Thefts
Consumers Governmental
investigators
Industry analysts Bank(er)=bank association
Credit card companies (VISA or
MasterCard)
Regulators
Security
analyst=technicians=security &
privacy experts
State and federal authorities
Activists’ group (Nonprofit
organization, privacy group)
Other retailer industry groups
Sago Mine Case US Airways Case Virginia Tech Case Wal-Mart Case
MSHA Shareholders Victims’
families=friends
Women employees in general
Victim’s families Delta Local community Lawyers for women
City of Sago Governmental
regulators
Students=faculty
Other airline
companies
Dell Case Ameren Case AG Gonzales Case Amtrak Case
Consumers Customers Senators=representatives The director= spokesperson of New
Jersey Transit
Shareholders Victims Senate committee State Senate
committee=government
Consumer Product Safety
Commission
Local
communities
Federal prosecutors Passengers=commuter=riders
Ford Case Utility spokesman
Shareholders Technicians= Amtrak engineers
Employees Community
United Auto Workers
Union
Mexican government
Auto consumers
CIA Case
Journalists=Media
Congress and US
government officials
Legal system=courts
American citizens
International bodies (Red
Cross, UN, etc.)
Foreign governments
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